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Introduction
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,' the most important
Supreme Court case in a generation concerning the regulation of the
electronic media,2 was revolutionary, but not in the way many observ-
ers expected. Those scholars, including the authors of this Article,
who thought that the case would provide a re-examination of funda-
mental First Amendment doctrine were sadly mistaken. The case, de-
ciding the constitutionality of the so-called "must-carry rules,"3
statutory provisions that require cable operators to carry certain com-
mercial and noncommercial broadcasters, was much heralded for its
potential for a breakthrough reconceptualization of First Amendment
doctrine. But traditional First Amendment theory emerged from the
Court's opinion largely unscathed and unexamined. What was radi-
cally reconsidered, recast, and even distorted were historical facts and,
with them, the traditional relationship between government and the
electronic media. The opportunity to reconsider the relationship be-
tween Congress and the organization and distribution of information
in American society was lost.
We have argued, prior to the Turner Broadcasting decision, what
seems to us the simple proposition: Congress ought to have a greater
role in regulating broadcast signal carriage where it has defined suita-
ble public goals-such as those relating to education, culture, or pub-
lic interest responsibilities-than where it has not.' Saving "free
television," a purpose attractive to the Supreme Court and found to
be such an appropriate goal, seems to us a relatively empty category,
precisely because it eschews considerations relating to substance (or
content, to use the First Amendment doctrinal word). We find a more
weighty and constitutionally defensible goal in the preservation of
noncommercial broadcasting, a purpose reflected in Congress' enact-
ment of a must-carry statute for noncommercial broadcasters distinct
from its provision for carriage of commercial broadcasters.
1. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994), vacating and re-
manding 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993), reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. 30 (1994).
2. We here refer to Red Lion Broadcasting as of antecedent singularity. See Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
3. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, §§ 4, 5, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 534, 535 (Supp. IV 1992)) [herein-
after 1992 Cable Act].
4. Donald W. Hawthorne & Monroe E. Price, Rewiring the First Amendment: Mean-
ing, Content and Public Broadcasting, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 499 (1994).
5. See 1992 Cable Act, supra note 3, § 4 (dealing with commercial broadcasters), § 5
(dealing with noncommercial broadcasters).
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Driven by its fixation on content-neutrality, the Turner Broad-
casting Court, far from recognizing the importance of the distinction
between commercial and noncommercial broadcasters, deemed it im-
material and practically non-existent. In this Article, we wish to re-
visit our analysis in light of Justice Kennedy's opinion. More
important and more therapeutic, we hope to extend our analysis to
future circumstances. The world, after Turner Broadcasting, is girding
for the next stages of the epic and long-enduring struggle surrounding
Congress' power to adjust and integrate the vast historic system of
"free" over-the-air broadcasting and the new technologies of cable,
direct broadcast satellite and the emerging national information high-
way. We hope to demonstrate how, despite the weaknesses in Turner
Broadcasting (and perhaps because of them), the constitutionality of
Congressional efforts to maintain public broadcasting stands on a dif-
ferent, and stronger footing, than similar efforts to support broadcast-
ers as a whole.
In the first sections of this Article, we explore how Justice Ken-
nedy upheld the must-carry rules while avoiding any searching re-ex-
amination of First Amendment doctrine. Despite a promisingly fact-
sensitive analysis of the nature of cable speakers, Justice Kennedy's
opinion turned in the end on a simple content-based litmus test. We
examine that doctrinal commitment and the creative storytelling re-
quired to justify mandatory carriage in its terms. Errors and exagger-
ations in judicial storytelling are significant because they can affect the
outcome of cases. In this case, however, their influence may go be-
yond the bounds of Turner Broadcasting to reshape the electronic reg-
ulatory regime in their distorted image. Ultimately, the implausibility
of the story Justice Kennedy tells reflects on the doctrine underlying
it.
We suggest that Justice Kennedy's rigid doctrinal approach can
potentially endanger all substantive government regulation of the
electronic media, especially measures designed to aid noncommercial
programmers. As challenges are inevitably raised to statutes, regula-
tions, and franchise agreements in the wake of Turner Broadcasting,
courts will again have the opportunity to consider the proper role of
content-based decision-making in electronic media regulation. We
hope that when those occasions arise, the issues we explore here con-
cerning the proper role of content considerations and the nature of
First Amendment speakers will be seriously considered.
In the concluding section of this Article, we discuss the extremely
important issues in the Court's instructions for the Turner Broadcast-
ing remand. For the purposes of the remand, the "law of the case" is
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that Section 5 and Section 4, the must-carry provisions of the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 19926 (1992
Cable Act) mandating carriage of noncommercial and commercial
broadcasting respectively, are "content-neutral." Phoenix-like, the
possibility of differential treatment of Section 5 and Section 4-gov-
erning noncommercial and commercial licensees-arises once again.
Under the Court's own test, the predictive and actual danger to non-
commercial broadcasting resulting from lack of a mandatory carriage
rule is far greater than the danger to the commercial broadcaster sys-
tem; in addition, the constitutional fit in Section 5 is superior to the
Congressional design in Section 4. These distinctions should lead the
three-judge court considering the remand of Turner Broadcasting and
Congress, when it takes up similar questions in the future, to view
more favorably regulatory measures grounded in the instructional, ed-
ucational and public interest concerns reflected in Section 5.
I
Storytelling and Turner Broadcasting
Turner Broadcasting, so long awaited as the definitive word on
the application of free speech principles to cable television regulation,
became instead an intriguing example of the convergence between law
and other literary media. Like the messages conveyed by much of the
electronic media, Turner Broadcasting is about storytelling, not truth;
it is about the power of the storyteller, not about objectivity; and it is
about the creativity of judges as authors, not as legal scientists. In
holding that Sections 4 and 5 were, by and large, content-neutral, the
Court necessarily depicted an entire world that the must-carry rules
inhabit.7 In doing so, Justice Kennedy was obliged to misrepresent
that world, and, where his world view was in too much tension with a
resistant reality, to enlist the power of the Court to change it.
6. See supra note 3.
7. The must-carry, or mandatory carriage, provisions, are not actually so prescriptive
as the terms suggest. A commercial broadcaster may deny a cable system the right to carry
its signal, or it might simply not demand carriage. 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
Noncommercial broadcasters may also waive mandatory carriage. Id. § 535(b)(1). If we
see the 1992 Cable Act as Congress' attempt to strengthen an integrated cable/over-the-air
broadcasting system, then these waiver provisions are arguably ill-tailored to accomplish
that purpose. On the other hand, as Justice Stevens suggested in his concurrence in Turner
Broadcasting, the must-carry and retransmission consent provisions may dovetail effec-
tively. 114 S. Ct. at 2474 (Stevens, J., concurring). Only those marginal stations too unpop-
ular or unprofitable to bargain for payment for carriage (and therefore most likely to be
dropped by a cable operator) will elect mandatory carriage. In this view, the 1992 Cable
Act's regime is narrowly drawn to aid just those stations that require government assist-
ance to be assured carriage.
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Our own hopes for a rational rethinking of First Amendment
doctrine had been raised by a colloquy during oral argument before
the Court. Justice Kennedy asked H. Bartow Farr, counsel for the
cable industry, an intriguing question: Whether Section 5,8 mandating
carriage of noncommercial television, was more vulnerable than Sec-
tion 4,9 mandating carriage of commercial broadcasters, under previ-
ous Court decisions that prohibit content-based regulation of the
press. Farr hesitatingly argued that both must-carry provisions were
unconstitutional. Justice Kennedy retorted that if public television,
which he considered "most justifiable" was also constitutionally "the
most vulnerable," that might mean that "there is something wrong
with the constitutional doctrine." 10
We were heartened by the possibility that Justice Kennedy, as ex-
emplified by this colloquy, was preparing to urge the Court to re-ex-
amine the inherited categories and mechanical analyses that have
become fixtures of First Amendment doctrine, to adopt a more
nuanced, fact-specific approach, to consider pragmatic outcomes as
well as theoretical categories, and even to reconsider the relationship
between Congress and the media.'1
As it turned out, that reading of Justice Kennedy's intent was dra-
matically wrong. The Turner Broadcasting decision preserved intact
the Supreme Court's traditional approach to First Amendment deci-
sion-making, with its fixation on content-neutrality and mechanical
application of stratified levels of scrutiny. In an ambiguous and am-
bivalent Turner Broadcasting decision, the Court more or less upheld
the power of Congress to assert its must-carry rules. More, because
the decision affirmed the capacity of Congress, in some circumstances,
to pursue regulatory goals protecting broadcasters and imposing car-
riage requirements on cable more onerous than the burdens govern-
ment can place on newspapers. Less, because the Court questioned
whether Congress had a sufficient basis for what it had done and took
the very unusual step of requiring additional proof. In fact, the Court
procrastinated, remanding the case to the district court for a determi-
8. 1992 Cable Act, supra note 3, § 5 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 535(a) (Supp. IV 1992)).
9. Id. § 4 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 534 (Supp. IV 1992)).
10. We have tried to reconstruct this exchange from the notes of observers, as there is
no official transcript of the oral argument.
11. In fact, Justice Kennedy's opinion in Turner Broadcasting is in line with the bright
line, intentionalist reading of the content-based distinction he has been fashioning in ear-
lier opinions. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims
Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 514 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that the "sole question"
in determining constitutionality is "whether the restriction is in fact content-based"); Ward
v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (government's purpose determines whether a
statute is content-based or content-neutral).
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nation of whether Congress or the government had a purpose suffi-
cient to justify Congress' actions and whether the strategy selected
was appropriately tailored. 2 The Court's reasoning was fragmented.
Although there was broad consensus on some points, Justice Kennedy
had difficulty assembling five votes for any outcome. Finally, Justice
Stevens, who favored affirming the decision of the three-judge district
court, and therefore upholding the must-carry rules, concurred in the
judgment to save a bare majority.'3
The doctrinal linchpin of the Court's opinion is Justice Kennedy's
conclusion that "[t]he design and operation of the challenged provi-
sions confirm that the purposes underlying the enactment of the must-
carry scheme are unrelated to the content of speech."' 4 In order to
reach this conclusion, Justice Kennedy not only ignored Congress'
clearly expressed, content-related purposes for enacting the must-
carry provisions; he eviscerated the Federal Communication Commis-
sion's authority and Congress' power to regulate broadcast licensees
substantially differently from cable programmers.
There were many reasons for Congress to establish a rule protect-
ing the system of broadcasting; the best ones, at least from a citizen's
perspective, had to do with the societal functions that broadcasting
uniquely performed, especially those mandated by Congress. Con-
gress' elaborate findings in the legislative history of the must-carry
provisions were in harmony with this civic perspective: Congress had
noted that broadcasters were "an important source of local news[,]
public affairs programming and other local broadcast services critical
to an informed electorate."' 5 Broadcasters grew up in a tradition
(now abandoned) in which they had to ascertain what needs the "com-
munity" had for a local station outlet. 6 For much of broadcasting's
recent history, it had obligations under the Fairness Doctrine affirma-
tively to cover controversial issues of public importance. Broadcasters
have been under special obligations affirmatively to hire minorities
and special incentives have been crafted to encourage minority owner-
ship of station licenses. All of these efforts were designed to render
the use of the scarce resource of the public airwaves. In short, Con-
gress has sought (ineffectively, to be sure) to shape the content of the
broadcasting system in the public interest and, for that very reason,
12. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2472.
13. Id. at 2475.
14. Id. at 2461.
15. Id. at 2462 (quoting Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 2(a)(11), 106 Stat. 1460 (1992)).
16. See Commission En Banc Programming Inquiry, Report and Statement Policy, 4
F.C.C. 2303 (1960).
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justified, in its findings, the obligation of cable outlets to facilitate
their carriage.
None of this could be squared with a pure theory of "content-
neutrality." From Justice Kennedy's doctrinal viewpoint, it was neces-
sary to deny that broadcasters possessed a set of law-derived values
related to the content of broadcast programming and providing the
basis for their congressional protection. To harmonize his needs with
history, the Justice was forced to denigrate the historic role of broad-
casters. The vice of deregulation became the virtue of neutrality; and
the virtue of public interest, the protection of children and other ef-
forts (however faltering) to improve broadcasting was converted into
the vice of content-specific intervention. Congressional efforts to
make broadcasters responsible were diminished, written out of his-
tory, and relegated to obscurity. By demonstrating that the FCC plays
an insignificant regulatory role, with little or no effective control over
programming content, Justice Kennedy avoided having to justify pref-
erential treatment of broadcasters based on any special, content-re-
lated social purpose.
To sustain his point, Justice Kennedy issued a series of intermedi-
ate dicta, virtual holdings on issues not argued or directly before the
Court. For example, Justice Kennedy concluded "[t]he FCC's over-
sight responsibilities do not grant it the power to ordain any particular
type of programming that must be offered by broadcast stations. '17
Given the minimal extent to which the FCC and Congress "actually
influence the programming offered by broadcast stations," the Justice
wrote, "it would be difficult to conclude that Congress enacted must-
carry in an effort to exercise content control over what subscribers
view on cable television."' 8 These characterizations of the relation-
ship between Congress and broadcasting have little basis in fact or
law. True, the FCC has never been a very effective regulator of the
medium and has been subject to criticism as much for its perceived
sweetheart relationship with the industry as for its intrusive regulatory
practices.' 9
In addition, the FCC has been operating under the sway of a der-
egulatory ideology for much of the last fifteen years. Still, broadcast-
ers have been licensees, yoked to the federal government, and have
17. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2463.
18. Id. at 2464.
19. See generally Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1103
(1993). For an older-fashioned view from the broadcast side, see also JON T. POWELL &
WALLY GAIR, PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE BUSINESS OF BROADCASTING: THE BROADCAST
INDUSTRY LOOKS AT ITSELF (1988).
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felt the indirect as well as direct pressure of the government to give
meaning to the term "public interest, convenience, and necessity" in
the Communications Act of 1934.20 To say otherwise is to put one's
head in the sand; the Supreme Court's gloss on the FCC's regulatory
power and its exercise confirms, without a case properly before it, the
narrowest tendencies of the FCC, those that totally surrender the reg-
ulatory impulse.
The Court's history of the relationship between the FCC and
noncommercial television is downright puzzling. Again, to demon-
strate the main point that Congress was not protecting broadcasters
because of their intrinsic value, the Court goes to pains to suggest that
there is little that is institutionally special, or content-related, about
noncommercial broadcasters.21 What is important, at least for this de-
cision, the Court states, "is that noncommercial licensees are not re-
quired by statute or regulation to carry any specific quantity of
'educational' programming or any particular 'educational' pro-
grams."22 The very fact that these are noncommercial licensees, that
their whole history is tied to instructional, public, and cultural devel-
opment is overlooked.
Given the travails of public broadcasters begging for congres-
sional appropriations, the lash of congressional interference, and the
abuse of funding restrictions to impose a heavier than healthy hand on
public broadcasting decisions, it is pollyannish to conclude, from a re-
view of recent history, that "the Government is foreclosed from using
its financial support to gain leverage over any programming deci-
sions."23 For Justice Kennedy, the only relevant fact (and the only
fact that could be relied upon by Congress) was that public broadcast-
ing stations augment something called a free broadcasting service. In-
deed, if Justice Kennedy sensed that there was another basis for
preferring public broadcasting stations (such as their contribution to
instruction, to diversity, or to the enhancement of public information),
significant problems might have existed with the constitutionality of
the statute.
Justice Kennedy's is a world in which there are no content-related
nuances because Congress and the FCC have few content-related
20. Pub. L. No. 416, § 1, 48 Stat. 562 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)).
21. The Court's only concession to the unique, legislated qualities of noncommercial
educational stations was to observe that they "may not broadcast promotional announce-
ments or advertisements on behalf of for-profit entities"-a vanishing distinction. Turner
Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2463.
22. Id.
23. Id. This passing comment may well prove, however, to be a boon to constitutional
arguments premised on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
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powers. Broadcast licensees cannot (or do not) have a content-based
task, whether they are commercial or noncommercial, that can be the
basis of a preference between them and cable programmers. The his-
toric modes of thinking about television-the accepted understanding
that noncommercial broadcasters are substantially distinct from other
over-the-air licensees-are converted to categories without meaning-
ful distinctions except for peculiarities in the ownership, license, or
affiliations of the licensee. To show how indifferent, in his view, Con-
gress was to the content-related consequences of its legislation, Justice
Kennedy used approvingly the following example: "if a cable system
were required to bump a cable programmer to make room for a
broadcast station, nothing would stop a cable operator from displacing
a cable station that provides all local- or education-oriented program-
ming with a broadcaster that provides very little."24 Aside from the
absence of logic in using the exceptional case to prove the intent of a
general rule, Justice Kennedy shows remarkable enthusiasm for oblit-
erating Congress' capacity and indicated interest in furthering educa-
tional and other public interest goals.
The strain of forcing the must-carry provisions into the content-
neutral mold shows elsewhere in the Court's opinion. To live within
his own ideology, Justice Kennedy is obliged to determine that the
must-carry rules "do not produce any net decrease in the amount of
available speech."25 If what Justice Kennedy means is that all cable
channels will be filled and therefore the "amount" of speech remains
the same, he is engaging in perilously flippant manipulation of the
concept of a net decrease in the amount of available speech. It could
be, of course, that speech markets are not adequately reflecting
viewer preferences, and hence that the speech displaced will be less
valuable to the audience than the speech substituted for it. But that is
a point Justice Kennedy leaves unexplored, and, indeed, must leave
unexplored, given his commitment to content-neutrality.
II
Turner Broadcasting, the Public Interest, and New
Technology
Logical gaps and revisionist regulatory history are not the worst
byproducts of the content-neutral doctrinal straitjacket. The decision
in Turner Broadcasting, because of the way it erects its doctrinal foun-
dation, presents new perils for educational broadcasters and for the
24. Id. at 2462.
25. Id.
SAVING PUBLIC TELEVISION1994]
capacity of Congress to assure that cable television systems continue
to carry them. For public broadcasters, there is more at stake than
mandatory carriage. A federal district court recently struck down the
portion of the 1992 Cable Act that requires operators of direct broad-
cast satellite cable to set aside a portion of their channel capacity for
"noncommercial programming of an educational or informational na-
ture. 26 Other courts have declared unconstitutional cable channel
set-asides for public, educational, and government ("PEG") uses that
have been mandated by local franchising authorities. 27 Turner Broad-
casting may provide a fresh impetus for similar attacks on regulations
favoring educational broadcasting. Public broadcasters have also pro-
posed reserving a portion of the "information highway" for public
purposes.28 The Turner Broadcasting decision's emphasis on content-
neutrality could present obstacles for that initiative and generally di-
minish federal influence over the architecture of the national informa-
tion infrastructure.
Such calamitous results for public broadcasting arise in the ana-
lytic framework employed by the Court: one in which mandatory car-
riage could be constitutionally permissible for commercial channels
but not for educational channels, because the former provision could
be construed as content-neutral, while the latter was content-based.
The Turner Broadcasting Court was spared coming to grips with this
implausible result because the Court and the parties before it did not
differentiate between the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 5. Their
failure to do so was not surprising. The broadcast industry, of course,
had no interest in arguing that non-commercial broadcasters had a
better claim to mandatory carriage. The cable industry argued that it
was a speaker whose rights were equally infringed by both kinds of
26. See Daniels Cablevision v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 1, 8-9 (D.D.C. 1993). The
Court's decision is being appealed, though the appeal was held in abeyance pending the
outcome of Turner Broadcasting.
27. See, e.g., Century Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 710 F. Supp. 1552 (N.D. Cal.
1987), appeal dismissed for want of juris., 484 U.S. 1053 (1988) (holding PEG access re-
quirements unconstitutional). Set-asides for PEG uses are authorized under 47 U.S.C.
§ 531 (Supp. IV 1992).
28. Drafters of the ill-fated "information superhighway" legislation in the House and
Senate proposed granting educational programming free preferred access to video plat-
forms provided by telephone companies and their video programming affiliates. See H.R.
3636, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 659 (1994); S. 1822, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 103 (1994). Senator
Dole cited what he called the "outlandish, if not unconstitutional" provision of S. 1822
requiring new networks to reserve part of their capacity for nonprofit television program-
mers as one of his reasons for mobilizing the opposition that doomed the legislation. Ed-
mund L. Andrews, The Phone Law Static, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1994, at C1, C3. '
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must-carry requirements. 29 Amici saw the issue in black and white, as
either well-deserved government regulation or an assault on civil lib-
erties.30  Even public broadcasters argued in terms that applied
equally to Sections 4 and 5.31 The United States alone constructed an
analytic framework that would have supported a distinction between
must-carry for commercial and noncommercial broadcasting, but it
did not rest its argument on that distinction. Instead, the Solicitor
General argued that the must-carry rules were merely economic
regulation.32
In retrospect, avoiding an argument that would require a distinc-
tion between commercial and public broadcasting was a wise strategic
choice given the jurisdictional tendencies that emerged. Application
of traditional First Amendment analytic categories raised the spectre
that mandatory educational carriage involves, oddly, more constitu-
tional questions than mandatory commercial carriage. The Court's so-
lution to this problem was to eliminate the distinction on which the
paradox turns: if, for purposes of constitutional determination, there
are no significant differences between commercial and noncommercial
broadcasting, then the content neutrality doctrine can, and must, em-
brace both.33
As we suggested in our pre-Turner Broadcasting tract,34 there is
another solution. In our view, Congress' power to impose any car-
riage requirement springs from the roles assigned to broadcasters in a
democratic society. Because noncommercial educational broadcasters
clearly have such responsibilities and because of the social significance
29. Brief of National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. at 19, Turner Broadcasting (No. 93-
44).
30. Compare Brief of Consumer Federation of America with Brief of American Civil
Liberties Union, Turner Broadcasting (No. 93-44).
31. Brief of Ass'n of America's Public Television Stations at 22, Turner Broadcasting
(No. 93-44).
32. This was the position adopted by the two-judge majority in the district court. See
Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. United States, 819 F. Supp. 32, 40-41 (D.D.C. 1993)
(Sporkin, J., concurring), vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994), reh'g denied, 115 S.
Ct. 30 (1994).
33. Where the Court detected potentially embarrassing departures from content-neu-
trality that could not be simply ignored, as in provisions that singled out noncommercial
broadcasters for special treatment, it left them to the district court on remand, with a
strong signal that they should be read out of the statute. For instance, the Court instructed
the district court to consider on remand whether 47 U.S.C. § 534(h)(2)(B) (requiring car-
riage of low power stations if, among other things, they address local news and informa-
tional needs) and § 534(h)(1)(C)(ii) (authorizing the FCC to grant must-carry privileges to
ineligible distant broadcasters on the basis, inter alia, of their attention to the value of
localism and provision of news coverage or sporting events of interest to the community)
are content-based regulation. See Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2460 n.6.
34. See Hawthorne & Price, supra note 4, at 510-13.
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of their role, the case for mandatory carriage of their signals is
stronger than for commercial broadcasters. It seems intuitively appar-
ent to us that Congress acted because it recognized that in a decent
society there should be an organ of cohesiveness called public service
broadcasting. Such an entity exists and is favored with federal funds
and frequencies precisely because it performs important functions in
society: functions of instruction, general cultural education, and fur-
therance of plural views. Congress had these criteria in mind when it
compelled cable systems to carry otherwise marginal, relatively infre-
quently viewed channels.
In this respect, our view is closer to those of Justice O'Connor.
Justice O'Connor recognized the importance of distinguishing be-
tween commercial and noncommercial broadcasting, and she distin-
guished them for the right reasons. In her discussion of content-based
speech restrictions, she suggested that public affairs and educational
programming "seem somewhat weightier" than the interests in local-
ism and diversity of viewpoints served by mandatory carriage of com-
mercial broadcasters, even though she found it "a difficult question
whether they are compelling enough to justify restricting other sorts
of speech."35 Furthermore, even if government could compel a chan-
nel set-aside for news or educational programming, Justice O'Connor
also questioned whether Section 5 is adequately tailored to meet the
appropriate First Amendment tests. In her view, the 1992 Cable Act's
mandatory carriage provisions improperly disadvantaged non-broad-
cast educational programmers in order to assist traditional public sta-
tions.36 Justice O'Connor wrote that "[e]ven if the Government can
restrict entertainment in order to benefit supposedly more valuable
speech, I do not think the restriction can extend to other speech that is
as valuable as the speech being benefitted."37 These are fair ques-
tions, and the ones that should have been met in vigorous debate; they
reflect a truer sense of what Congress sought to do, and the environ-
ment in which it tried to do it, than the distorted world view that
emerged from the majority's opinion.
The logic and realism of Justice O'Connor's opinion suggests con-
tinuing room (given the upcoming debates over direct broadcasting,
video dialtone, and the information superhighway) for addressing
more explicitly the question whether, economic regulation largely
35. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2478 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 2479.
37. Id.
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aside,38 Congress is warranted, precisely for content-related reasons,
in imposing the kind of architectural and structural laws contained in
the 1992 Cable Act. In our view, in Section 5 of the 1992 Cable Act,
Congress quite properly selected one set of speakers over another.
We would argue, in fact, that the Court might have more appropri-
ately concluded that the absence of a content basis for Congress' ac-
tions would have precluded, rather than permitted, a preference. The
Court's view that broadcasters as a class can be preferred precisely
because they have freed themselves of all substantive public interest
obligations is troublesome. Our point is not that such obligations as
furthering children's programming or accommodating political candi-
dates necessarily merit mandatory carriage, but rather that if broad-
casters are free to ignore them then there is no discernible difference
between commercial broadcasters and other sources of cable pro-
gramming, and hence no rational basis for Section 4's preference for
commercial broadcasters over their cable programming competitors.
Our reading of regulatory history and the social role of noncom-
mercial broadcasting, and of Congress' purposes in mandating its car-
riage, also differs from the Court's. Public stations are not
unregulated, undirected entities, and they should not become so.
They have been licensed and established for important content-re-
lated reasons,39 and those are precisely the reasons that they merit
mandatory carriage. Noncommercial broadcasters carry on govern-
ment's historic responsibility for education of the public and the more
recent role it has undertaken in support of the arts.4° In fact, it is
likely because of their distinctive content that noncommercial stations
are somewhat favored under the 1992 Cable Act's mandatory carriage
regime, with special guarantees (disregarded by the Court) to assure
that noncommercial service is strengthened. 41 The Turner Broadcast-
38. Economic regulation is relevant, even in our analysis, in determining what kind of
entity may be subject to regulation. See infra part V.
39. See QUALITY TIME? THE REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK
FORCE ON PUBLIC TELEVISION 9 (Twentieth Century Fund Press 1993).
40. As the Court has recognized, "education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments," as evidenced by "[c]ompulsory school attendance laws and
the great expenditures for education." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (education is not "merely some govern-
mental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation"); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,400 (1923) (the "American people have always regarded education
and [the] acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance").
41. For example, the statute requires a cable system with a capacity of 37 channels to
devote up to one-third of its channels to commercial must-carries, but carry all nonduplica-
tive noncommercial stations requesting carriage. 47 U.S.C. § 535(e) (Supp. IV 1992). Sim-
ilarly, § 5 provides a step toward universal access to public television by requiring cable
operators to import a public broadcast station to service areas that do not have one. 1992
1994]
ing majority opinion's mischaracterizations of commercial and non-
commercial broadcasting were not, in our view, mere errors or over-
sights. They followed, perhaps inevitably, from the effort to compre-
hend an outcome-conscious, regulatory restructuring of public
discourse in the purely formal analytic categories of traditional First
Amendment analysis. In opposition to the Turner Broadcasting ma-
jority's analytic methodology, we advocate here something closer to
Justice O'Connor's approach: a jurisprudence of meaning, in which,
at least in some forms of congressional action, content considerations
are relevant to First Amendment analysis.
IH
Content-Based Favoritism
While the Court has struggled to define the attributes of content-
based regulation in recent years,42 the core significance of the distinc-
tion between content-based and content-neutral regulation has re-
mained unchanged. Because of the threat to individual liberty and the
democratic process in government suppression of "dangerous" ideas,
all content-based regulations "presumptively violate the First Amend-
ment."43 Content-neutral regulations are subject to more relaxed
scrutiny and will pass muster if they further "an important or substan-
tial government interest; if the government interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on al-
leged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest."44 While this distinction has recently
Cable Act, supra note 3, § 5 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 535 (Supp. IV 1992)). No such re-
quirement exists under § 4. Id. § 4 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 534 (Supp. IV 1992)).
42. The Court has recently wrestled with the definition of content-based regulation in
a number of cases. Compare City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47
(1986) (restrictions on speech are content-neutral if they are "justified without reference to
the content of the regulated speech") with Simon & Schuster v. Members of N.Y. State
Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 509 (1991) (rejecting the argument that discriminatory
treatment is suspect "only when the legislature intends to suppress certain ideas") and City
of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1516 (1993) (a regulation is con-
tent-based when one must consider the content of an act or utterance to determine
whether it falls within the scope of the regulation). Although much of the argument in
Turner Broadcasting involved the definition of content-based legislation, the Court did not
revisit the question. In any case, it is immaterial to our argument here, since we would
concede that § 5 is content-based under any definition proposed by the parties in Turner
Broadcasting.
43. Renton, 475 U.S. at 47.
44. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2469 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 377 (1968)).
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been attacked by some scholars,45 largely in the context of hate speech
and pornography, in the courts the content-based dogma reigns un-
compromised and almost uniformly unquestioned.46
The Turner Broadcasting Court has now held that Section 5, the
must-carry provision for noncommercial broadcast stations, is not con-
tent-based. This is the law of the case and, fortunately for public tele-
vision in the short run, not open for reexamination. That ruling may
enable Section 5 to survive review by the three-judge court on remand
and will give public broadcasting's precious language to invoke when
faced with congressional efforts to censor programming content. All
this aside, however, in the long run, the conclusion is troubling and,
notwithstanding the Court's determination, it appears inescapable to
us that Section 5 is content-based on its face; in our view, that is its
saving grace.47
45. One commentator notes: "Sometimes constitutional doctrine seems to have lost
sight of the point of central constitutional commitments. Sometimes the commitment to
free speech seems like an abstraction insufficiently.., connected with democratic goals, or
indeed with any clearly describable set of governing aspirations." Cass R. Sunstein, Words,
Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 797 (1993). See also Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword:
The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 30, 107 (1993).
46. Although we agree with the criticism that reflexive reliance on doctrine can yield
results at odds with underlying First Amendment purposes, the rationale for content-based
broadcast regulation is distinct from, and says nothing about, the appropriateness of elimi-
nating the content-based distinction in the contexts of pornography or hate speech.
Among other distinctions, the content-based regulations we advocate here are affirmative
speech requirements. There are strong arguments for retaining the bright-line rule against
content-based prohibitions of speech, which are implicated to a far lesser degree, if at all,
when government affirmatively mandates speech concerning a particular subject matter.
47. The definition of a "qualified noncommercial educational television station" in-
cludes stations that transmit "predominantly noncommercial programs for educational
purposes." 47 U.S.C. § 535(l)(1) (Supp. IV 1992). See also Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct.
at 2476 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I cannot avoid the conclusion that [the statute's] pref-
erence for broadcasters over cable programmers is justified with reference to content").
Even the government recognized that this section "might be characterized as favoring edu-
cational speech over entertainment." Brief for Federal Appellees at 38 n.25, Turner
Broadcasting (No. 93-44). Of course, § 5 does not express a preference for a particular
viewpoint, but it is content-based insofar as it favors a particular subject matter. There is
language in Turner Broadcasting and other cases suggesting that subject-matter distinctions
should be accorded a lower level of scrutiny than content-based or viewpoint-based distinc-
tions. See Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2481 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (the must-carry rules "do not differentiate on the basis of 'viewpoint,'
and therefore do not fall in the category of speech regulation that Government must avoid
most assiduously"); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality opin-
ion) (applying content-neutral balancing to subject-matter restriction). In general, how-
ever, the Court has not recognized the validity of holding subject-matter distinctions to a
lower level of First Amendment scrutiny. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) (holding subject matter-based speech
restriction unconstitutional); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530, 537 (1980) ("[t]he First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends
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According to First Amendment tradition and the Turner Broad-
casting Court, recognition of such a content-basis leads almost inevita-
bly to a declaration of unconstitutionality. But it need not be so. In
cases involving mandated access to broadcast and cable media, con-
tent-based distinctions have sometimes been viewed not oily as per-
missible, but as the very basis for a regulation's constitutionality. Of
course, as the Turner Broadcasting Court recognized, broadcasters
have been viewed as uniquely vulnerable to regulation, chiefly be-
cause of the scarcity of the broadcast spectrum. But the significant
lesson to be drawn from the broadcast mandated access cases is that
content-based regulations were not permitted willy-nilly merely be-
cause broadcaster speakers are entitled to less First Amendment pro-
tection; rather, particular content-based regulations were deemed
constitutional because of the particular content they preferred or pre-
scribed. Such regulations have typically been subject to a positive
content-based test: Only if an appropriate content is mandated and
an appropriate purpose served has broadcast regulation been upheld.
In CBS, Inc. v. FCC,4" for example, the Court upheld a provision
of the Communications Act of 193449 that requires broadcast licensees
to grant access to qualified candidates for federal elective office. Such
a regulation is constitutional, concluded the CBS Court, because it
makes "a significant contribution to freedom of expression by enhanc-
ing the ability of candidates to present, and the public to receive, in-
formation necessary for the effective operation of the democratic
process."5 In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,5 the Court upheld
the constitutionality of preferential treatment for minorities in the
transfer of broadcast licenses, reasoning that a minority owner's status
not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion
of an entire topic").
48. 453 U.S. 367 (1981). The Court made clear that the scarcity rationale was insuffi-
cient to justify a general right of access to the media. The statute was constitutional be-
cause of the specific nature of the content it prescribed: information crucial to the
democratic process. Id. at 395-96. See also FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364,
380 (1984) (restrictions on broadcasters upheld only when they are "narrowly tailored to
further a substantial governmental interest, such as ensuring adequate and balanced cover-
age of public issues") (citations ommitted); Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654,
683 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990) (Starr, J., dissenting) ("Spectrum
scarcity, without more, does not necessarily justify regulatory schemes which intrude into
First Amendment territory. This point is made clear by the familiar cases in which the
Court has upheld broadcast regulation on the ground that the regulation furthered substan-
tial First Amendment interests .... ) (emphasis added).
49. Pub. L. No. 416, § 1, 48 Stat. 562 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7)
(1988)).
50. 453 U.S. at 396.
51. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
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"influences the selection of topics for news coverage and the presenta-
tion of editorial viewpoint, especially on matters of particular concern
to minorities." 2 The Court has also upheld FCC regulations prohibit-
ing common ownership of a newspaper and a broadcast license serv-
ing the same area, on the basis that the prohibition "enhanced the
diversity of information" and promoted the "public interest in diversi-
fied mass communications."53 Such cross-ownership restrictions may
appear to be content-neutral, and the Court so regarded them. How-
ever, the Court's reasoning makes clear that the regulation was per-
missible because separately held media could reasonably be assumed
to have a more diverse content than commonly held media. The regu-
lation, in other words, was permissible because of its content-based
effects.54
The Court also recognized content-based concerns, such as diver-
sity and localism, as the basis for the FCC's statutory authority to reg-
ulate the cable industry under the Communications Act of 1934. The
Court found that the FCC had the authority to regulate cable because
cable systems could threaten the survival of educational broadcasters
and commercial broadcasters that provide outlets for "local self-ex-
pression. ' 55 Similarly, the Court held that local origination require-
ments imposed on cable operators by the FCC were constitutional
because they were reasonably tailored to increase "the number of out-
lets for community self-expression" and to augment "the public's
choice of programs and types of services."'56 Recent lower court deci-
sions have also upheld content-based mandatory carriage cable regu-
52. Id. at 581. In other words, minority broadcasters were favored because they could
be expected to provide distinctive content.
53. FCC v. National Citizens Comm'n For Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 802 (1978) (ci-
tation omitted). Cable has similar cross-ownership restrictions. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C.
§ 533(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1992) (cable-broadcast licensee); id. § 533(a)(2) (cable-MMDS/
SMATV); id. § 533(b) (cable-telephone); 47 C.F.R. § 76.501(a)(1) (1993) (cable-network).
However, restrictions on common ownership of cable and telephone licenses have been
declared unconstitutional by several courts. See U.S. West, Inc. v. United States, 855 F.
Supp. 1184 (W.D. Wash. 1994); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F.
Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993).
54. Justice O'Connor's dissent in Turner Broadcasting shares this view: "The interest
in ensuring access to a multiplicity of diverse and antagonistic sources of information ... is
directly tied to the content of what the speakers will likely say." 114 S. Ct. at 2477
(O'Connor, J. dissenting).
55. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 174-76 (1968).
56. United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 667-68 (1972). However, the
Court later rejected FCC authority to mandate cable access channels absent explicit con-
gressional authorization. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 707-09 (1979) (gov-
ernment interests such as increasing outlets for community self-expression were not
sufficiently compelling to overcome the statutory ban on treating broadcasters (and, by
analogy, cable operators) as common carriers),
lations, such as franchise agreements requiring carriage of local
origination programming,57 where the content distinction served an
appropriate public purpose.58
How such content-based regulations will fare after Turner Broad-
casting is an open question. They are largely enacted pursuant to
powers specifically granted by Congress, such as the power to estab-
lish requirements in a franchise that channel capacity be set aside for
public, educational, or governmental use.59 Other provisions, such as
local origination requirements, may exist only in a particular
franchise. But all such regulations must be viewed as suspect after
57. For example, the Seventh Circuit upheld a content-based cable franchise provision
that required franchisees to offer a certain amount of programming developed "specifically
for the community" served by the franchisee. Chicago Cable Communications v. Chicago
Cable Comm'n, 879 F.2d 1540, 1543 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990). The
court found that "[p]romotion of community self-expression can increase direct communi-
cation between residents by featuring topics of local concern," and held that
"[e]ncouragement of 'localism' certainly qualifies as an important or substantial interest."
Id. at 1549. See also Daniels Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C.
1993) (upholding PEG and leased access requirements on the grounds that "affording
speakers with lesser market appeal access to the nation's most pervasive video distribution
technology" serves a significant regulatory interest); Telesat Cablevision, Inc. v. City of
Riviera Beach, 773 F. Supp. 383, 411-12 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (PEG requirements are permissi-
ble content-neutral regulation); Erie Telecommunications v. City of Erie, 659 F. Supp. 580,
599-601 (W.D. Pa. 1987), affd on other grounds, 853 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1988) (upholding
leased access and PEG channel requirements of one public, one religious, three educa-
tional, one library, one social service, one arts and sports, one hospital, two leased, and two
governmental access channels). But see, e.g., Century Fed., Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 710 F.
Supp. 1552, appeal dismissed, 484 U.S. 1053 (1988) (striking down PEG requirements);
Group W Cable v. City of Santa Cruz, 669 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (same); Weinberg,
supra note 19, at 1104-05 n.6 (collecting cases overturning cable regulations).
58. Where similar content-based cable regulations have been held unconstitutional, as
in the Preferred Communications litigation, the basis for the court's ruling was not the
mere fact that the regulation was content-based but the degree of infringement on the
cable operator's rights that the particular regulation threatened. Preferred Communica-
tions, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 67 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 366, aff'd in part, vacated in
relevant part, 13 F.3d 1327 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2738 (1994). The Pre-
ferred Communications district court recognized that localism and access requirements
were content-based and served a compelling state interest. The court ruled that the local-
ism provision was acceptable because it was only a "consideration" rather than a formal
requirement, id. at 374, but struck down the access provisions on the grounds that the city
had failed to show with any specificity that the allotment of one-sixth of the operator's
channel capacity to access channels was narrowly tailored to further those interests. Id. at
374-75. The court's ruling left open the possibility that, if more carefully tailored or sup-
ported by a fuller record, the access channels might be upheld. More important, the mere
fact that the franchise requirements were clearly content-based did not immediately con-
demn them.
59. 47 U.S.C. § 531(a) (Supp. IV 1992). The voluntary contractual nature of franchise
agreements invites the defense that no franchisee is compelled to accept a city's terms.
That argument invites the response that government may not impose unconstitutional con-
ditions on discretionary benefits.
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Turner Broadcasting, since their content basis insures that they will be
subject to searching scrutiny. On the other hand, the careful analysis
of purposes and means undertaken in recent cases like Preferred
Communications6" may provide a model for a successful post-Turner
Broadcasting defense of clearly content-based regulations, particularly
if the Court adopts the sensitive, substantive content analysis of
O'Connor's Turner Broadcasting dissent and advocated here.
IV
Section 5 Distinguished from Section 4
The Supreme Court in Turner Broadcasting not only ignored the
differences between Section 4 and Section 5 of the 1992 Cable Act, it
treated them as if they were indivisible parts of a seamless whole.
That treatment represents a profound mischaracterization of the stat-
ute. The two sections have different histories, purposes, degrees of
tailoring of means to ends, and different roles to play in a democratic
society. On remand, these differences may be more important than
the similarities between Sections 4 and 5.
We believe that Congress should be able to mandate access for
educational broadcasters precisely because of their content and be-
cause Section 5 is tailored to meet Congress' objectives. Section 4, on
the other hand, is more constitutionally suspect because there is little
content-based justification for preferring commercial broadcasters to
competing cable programmers, and the means for implementing the
asserted government interest is not well-tailored. Those aspects of the
mandatory carriage regime that appeared to weigh most heavily in
favor of the statute's constitutionality for the Turner Broadcasting
Court seem weaknesses to us, while the Court's analytic method,
which papered over the substantive differences between commercial
and non-commercial broadcasters, seems to bypass or ignore distinc-
tions crucial to a new First Amendment approach.
Mandatory carriage of educational programming not only serves
a compelling government interest, but it also serves an interest that
furthers core First Amendment values. Public education is of course
one of the central functions of modern American government, and an
educated populace is a cornerstone of democratic self-governance. 6'
60. See supra note 58.
61. As the Court has observed, education is crucial to the "preparation of individuals
for participation as citizens" and invests "fundamental values necessary to the maintenance
of a democratic political system." Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979). Educa-
tion of all citizens is "required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities"
and "the very foundation of good citizenship." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493
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But it is significant that education also serves the same purposes com-
monly ascribed to the First Amendment itself: facilitating democratic
discourse and the search for "political truth," as well as encouraging
individuals to "develop their faculties."62 Hence, mandating carriage
of educational programming may further First Amendment values,
even if it comes at the expense of the "speech" of cable operators and
their preferred programming sources.
Moreover, mandatory carriage of noncommercial broadcasters is
well-tailored to effect the goal of furthering public education. Non-
commercial must-carry is less burdensome than commercial must-
carry, involves fewer channels, and is therefore less subject to charac-
terization as significantly foreclosing the cable operator's right to
choose program providers or bundle programming to maximize con-
sumer welfare. While the evidence of the plight of commercial broad-
casting is at best equivocal, educational broadcasters were genuinely
imperiled in the days before mandatory carriage.63 In sum,
mandatory carriage rules for public broadcasting serve a significant
purpose and impose only modest burdens, while no less burdensome
alternative appears likely to ensure that the institution of noncommer-
cial broadcasting survives unimpaired.
In our view, if the regulatory regime were more demanding, the
argument for carriage of commercial stations would have been
stronger, not weaker as the Court suggests. Historically, in the United
States, commercial broadcasters have been viewed as holders of a
public trust, encapsulating a bundle of obligations that were properly
thought to be necessary for the public interest. These obligations in-
cluded providing service to the local community, coverage of contro-
versial issues of public importance in a way that exhibited fairness,
preferred access to candidates as advertisers, programming for chil-
dren, and other aspects of a well-rehearsed litany. In recent years,
(1954). See generally Lawrence A. Cremin, AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE METROPOLITAN
EXPERIENCE, 1876-1980 (1988) (discussing the relationship of education and democracy).
Congress explicitly recognized the connection between education, public television, and
the democratic process, in its funding of "instructional, educational, and cultural" program-
ming through the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(1) (Supp. IV
1992). As Congress has found, public stations constitute "valuable local community re-
sources for . . . address[ing] national concerns and solv[ing] local problems." Id.
§ 396(a)(8).
62. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
63. According to the FCC, between 1985 and 1988, 153 public television stations
(nearly half of all such stations) were dropped or denied carriage 463 times by 347 cable
systems. FCC MASS MEDIA BUREAU CABLE SYSTEM BROADCAST SIGNAL CARRIAGE
SURVEY, STAFF REPORT BY THE POLICY AND RULES DIVISION 10 (Sept. 1, 1988). During
that time, 182 public television stations were involuntarily repositioned on 541 occasions.
Id. at 19.
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however, broadcasters have been able to convince the FCC and Con-
gress that they should not be bound by these public interest
obligations.
The success of their lobbying efforts is highlighted by the recent
FCC determination that home shopping channels are eligible for
mandatory carriage because they meet the public interest standard.64
We believe that the FCC's embrace of home shopping stations should
have undermined any claim that commercial stations are eligible for
the privilege of mandatory carriage-not because of something in-
nately flawed about home shopping, but because, given the inclusion
of home shopping within the scope of "the public interest," there are
no relevant criteria by which to distinguish "local commercial sta-
tions" from other program providers, such as cable networks. 65
Therefore, Congress should not be able to extend preferential treat-
ment for one over the other. Given the analytic framework adopted
by the Turner Broadcasting Court, however, the FCC's holding that
home shopping channels serve the public interest probably strength-
ened the case for Section 4, by weakening further the content require-
ments applicable to commercial broadcasting.
V
Regulating "Speakers" Under the First Amendment
Constitutional objections to mandatory carriage spring from two
basic presumptions of First Amendment doctrine. We have already
discussed the first: that content-based regulation is subject to a
heightened scrutiny that is all but insurmountable. The second pre-
sumption might be called "speaker absolutism," the principle that a
speaker's rights are independent of the speaker's physical properties,
institutional status, social role, and history, and can derive from noth-
ing more than an entity's self-designation as a speaker. This second
principle creates an additional hurdle for cable regulation, since any
distinction between Section 4 and Section 5 may be constitutionally
meaningless if both are seen as infringing the rights of a core First
Amendment speaker. The examples of constitutionally permissible
content-based favoritism discussed so far have this in common: They
do not impose restrictions on anything resembling the legendary Hyde
Park corner orator.
64. See In re Implementation of Section 4(g) of the Cable Television Consumer Pro-
tection and Competition Act of 1992, Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 5321 (1993).
65. This argument does not address antitrust violations or other discriminatory actions
by vertically integrated cable operators.
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Cable operators, then, must be distinguishable from the general
run of First Amendment speakers to warrant more intrusive govern-
ment regulation. In its arguments in Turner Broadcasting, the govern-
ment found the distinguishing feature in the concept of "market
dysfunction," which it defined as the power of a private entity to si-
lence others' speech, whether because of physical limitations in the
medium, economic monopoly, or government-conferred advantages.66
The government's position is accurate as a matter of description.
Cable operators do in fact operate under conditions of scarcity, do
generally enjoy an economic monopoly (whether natural or conferred
by a franchise), and are the beneficiaries of government advantages,
from initial selection to government-sponsored monopoly.
The Court, however, was unconvinced. Justice Kennedy rejected
the government's argument as a mischaracterization of Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,67 which the Court interpreted narrowly as
deriving its mandate to regulate broadcasting solely from spectrum
scarcity and signal interference. Interpreting market dysfunction in
purely economic terms, the Court also had little difficulty in establish-
ing that its prior holdings do not support the proposition that market
failure alone is sufficient grounds to lower the applicable standard of
review.68 The Court declined to apply broadcast regulation's relaxed
First Amendment scrutiny to cable on the basis that cable does not
suffer from the technological limitations of the broadcast medium.69
There are elements of speaker absolutism in the Court's analysis.
For example, the Court invokes the principle that "each person should
decide for him or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression,
consideration, and adherence," as if mandating broadcast carriage on
a cable network was equivalent to compelling an individual to re-
nounce her faith or denounce his family.7°
However, for an example of the extreme consequences of
speaker absolutism, one must look to Justice O'Connor's dissent. Jus-
tice O'Connor insists that it should be the cable operator, not govern-
ment, that has "control over who gets to speak over cable."'71 Once
again, Justice O'Connor is strong on the facts. Because many cable
operators are monopolists, she observes, viewers' preferences will not
necessarily prevail. But, rather than seeing in this monopoly position
66. Brief for Federal Appellees at 35-36, Turner Broadcasting (No. 93-44).
67. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
68. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2457-58.
69. Id. at 2457.
70. Id. at 2458.
71. Id. at 2480.
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a rationale for regulation, the Justice regards the First Amendment as
compelling the conclusion that "a single cable operator," as a speaker
with editorial discretion, should be able to "decide what millions of
subscribers can or cannot watch."72 Only a fetishistic concept of First
Amendment speakers and a Manichean view of government regula-
tion could lead one to conclude that the First Amendment forbids
Congress from denying one-third of its channel capacity to a corpo-
rate entity created primarily to make profits, not express opinions, at
the expense of the information needs and preferences of millions of
flesh and blood human beings.73
The majority opinion stops well short of Justice O'Connor's
speaker fetishism. In fact, in an exercise of careful, fact-sensitive adju-
dication, the majority justifies significant limitations on the rights of
cable speakers, based on two peculiarities of the medium. Justice
Kennedy recognizes that once a "cable operator has selected the pro-
gramming sources, the cable system functions, in essence, as a conduit
for the speech of others, transmitting it on a continuous and unedited
basis-to subscribers. ' 74 Quoting a commentator, the Court observes
that "If]or the most part, cable personnel do not review any of the
material provided by cable networks ... [C]able systems have no con-
scious control over program services provided by others. 75
This relaxed level of supervision over content, which distin-
guishes cable from the typical, or idealized, newspaper,76 is significant
because the recognition of cable operators' First Amendment rights
depends in large part on the editorial functions they perform. How-
ever, the majority does not suggest that cable operators are generally
entitled to reduced protection because of their limited editorial role.
Rather, the Court relies on the conduit function to blunt the argument
that mandatory carriage is coerced speech. One of the dangers of co-
erced carriage of the speech of others is that the speaker will become
72. Id.
73. Justice O'Connor suggests that Congress could deal with the dangers posed by the
immense power of cable operators by encouraging competition, subsidizing broadcasters,
or, perhaps, obligating cable operators to act as common carriers for part of their channels.
Id. If, as the Justice says, Congress could achieve the purposes of the must-carry statute by
providing content-based subsidies to broadcasters, then, in Justice O'Connor's view, the
only objectionable aspect of the must-carry rules must be that they require cable speakers
to say certain things of the government's choosing.
74. Id. at 2452 (citing Daniel Brenner, Cable Television and the Freedom of Expres-
sion, 1988 DUKE L.J. 329, 339).
75. Id.
76. Cf. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). Newspapers,
unlike cable operators, exercise active control over the writing, viewpoint, and selection of
their material. Id. at 247.
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identified with the compelled speech. If the speaker does not agree,
or wants to make clear it does not endorse the compelled statements,
it may be forced to make further declarations of its own to clarify its
position. These liabilities proved fatal to right-of-reply statutes guar-
anteeing access to newspapers.77 But the Turner Broadcasting Court
drew a distinction in the case of cable: "[g]iven cable's long history of
serving as a conduit for broadcast signals, there appears little risk that
cable viewers would assume that the broadcast stations carried on a
cable system convey ideas or messages endorsed by the cable opera-
tor," and hence little pressure on the cable operator to alter its own
messages in response. 8
More important, the Court focussed on a technological feature of
cable that distinguishes it even from monopoly newspapers:
Although a daily newspaper and a cable operator both may enjoy
monopoly status in a given locale, the cable operator exercises far
greater control over access to the relevant medium. A daily news-
paper ... does not possess the power to obstruct readers' access to
other competing publications .... The same is not true of cable.
When an individual subscribes to cable, the physical connection be-
tween the television set and the cable network gives the cable oper-
ator bottleneck, or gatekeeper, control over most (if not all) of the
television programming that is channeled into the subscriber's
home. Hence, simply by virtue of its ownership of the essential
pathway for cable speech, a cable operator can prevent its subscrib-
ers from obtaining access to programming it chooses to exclude. A
cable operator, unlike speakers in other media, can thus silence the
voice of competing speakers with a mere flick of the switch.79
This insight, strongly reminiscent of the government's spurned market
dysfunction theory, allowed the Court to distinguish two important
arguments against mandatory carriage.80 First, cable's bottleneck
function distinguished Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,s l
which struck down a right-of-reply statute applying to newspapers.
Instead of relying mechanically on cable's designation as a speaker,
the Court, in the above-quoted passage, sensitively weighed the po-
tential for harm to the public's speech interests posed by the peculiari-
77. Id.; see also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1
(1986) (plurality opinion) (private utility could not be compelled to provide space in billing
envelopes for newsletter from critical consumer group).
78. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2465.
79. Id. at 2466.
80. The bottleneck rationale for regulation is also akin to Justice Stevens' argument
that cable may be subject to "intrusive regulation that would be inappropriate and perhaps
impermissible for other communicative media" because cable operators control an "essen-
tial facility." Id. at 2473 (Stevens, J., concurring). For Justice Stevens, that characteristic
was sufficient to establish the validity of mandatory carriage without requiring a remand or
further fact-finding. Id.
81. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
HASTINGS COMmV/ENT L.J. [Vol. 17:65
ties of this particular speaker. If cable speakers' rights are less
inviolate than newspapers' rights, that is because of technological pe-
culiarities that make cable, with its near-total control over the distri-
bution of video information, a more potent threat to speech.
The Court also relied on the bottleneck function to distinguish
the line of cases holding that strict scrutiny should be applied when
government regulation singles out certain members of the press for
disfavored treatment.82 Unlike cable, other multichannel video dis-
tributors such as multichannel multipoint distribution systems
(MMDS) and satellite master antenna television (SMATV) are not
required to carry broadcast networks. But the Court concluded that
the differential treatment is justified since these media are not subject
to monopoly bottleneck control as in cable.83
The Court concluded its consideration of cable speakers with a
far-reaching observation: "The First Amendment's command that
government not impede the freedom of speech does not disable the
government from taking steps to ensure that private interests not re-
strict, through physical control of a critical pathway of communica-
tion, the free flow of information and ideas."8 4 In that statement, the
Court rejected speaker absolutism and declared a fundamental split in
First Amendment policy that may shape the Court's jurisprudence for
years to come. In response to the view expressed by Justice O'Connor
and her three concurring Justices, "that it is government power, rather
than private power, that is the main threat to free expression,"85 the
majority found that "[t]he potential for abuse of [cable operators'] pri-
vate power over a central avenue of communication cannot be over-
looked."86 How that philosophical debate is resolved will determine
Congress' power to continue to play a role in structuring the private
speech marketplace.
The Court's recognition of cable's "physical control of a critical
pathway of communication"87 also comes close to announcing the
long-anticipated standard for cable regulation: that as long as the lo-
cal cable monopoly continues, and as long as government operates in
a content-neutral manner, it may be permitted to regulate cable more
intrusively than newspapers, if not with the free hand given to broad-
82. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2468; see also Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v.
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
83. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2468.
84. Id. at 2466.
85. Id. at 2480.
86. Id. at 2466.
87. Id.
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cast regulation. At least for the present, the Court appears to have
situated cable at an intermediate position in the First Amendment hi-
erarchy, between newspaper publishers and broadcasters.
The Turner Broadcasting Court thus managed to loose itself, per-
haps only temporarily, from the straitjacket of speaker absolutism.
But it drew back from addressing the ultimate question about First
Amendment speakers: How institutional speakers are created and
recognized in our society and how their natural history, the process by
which they are formed and endowed with the capacity to speak, re-
flects on their First Amendment rights.
The First Amendment tradition is grounded on the image of natu-
ral, self-created speakers, existing independent of and prior to govern-
ment intervention. That image does not fit the reality of the new
communications technologies and the institutional speakers based on
them. These new, technology-dependent speakers rely for their exist-
ence on government protection, regulation, and subsidy. But when it
is in their interest to assert a claim to First Amendment speakerhood,
the same institutions proclaim their independence and immunity from
the state that fostered them.88
The cable industry is a central example: In its early years, the
government guaranteed cable operators access to existing transmis-
sion poles, easements, and compulsory licenses,89 and restricted the
power of local governments to regulate cable rates and charge
franchise fees.9" Having grown successful in large part through gov-
ernment intervention and assistance, the cable industry now suddenly
declares its independence, arguing, as it did in Turner Broadcasting,
that it is a speaker entitled to First Amendment protection from gov-
ernment regulation.9'
88. Sunstein argues that government's role in establishing and making viable new
technology industries must condition and limit their claims to First Amendment rights and
immunity from state regulation. Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
255, 278-91 (1992); see generally CAss R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993),
89. See, e.g., Thomas A. Hart, Jr., The Evolution of Telco-Constructed Broadband
Services for CATV Operators, 34 CATI. U. L. REV. 697 (1985); R. Clark Wadlow & Linda
M. Wellstein, The Changing Regulatory Terrain of Cable Television, 35 CATH. U. L. REV.
705 (1986).
90. See Henry Geller et al., The Cable Franchise Fee and the First Amendment, 39 FED.
COMM. L.J. 1 (1987); Peter Krug, Cable Television Franchise Fees for General Revenue:
The 1984 Cable Television Act, Wisconsin Law, and the First Amendment, 1985 WIs. L.
REV. 1273 (1985).
91. See Glenn B. Manishin, An Antitrust Paradox for the 1990's: Revisiting the Role of
the First Amendment in Cable Television, 9 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1990); Wein-
berg, supra note 19.
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It is a promising indication that the Turner Broadcasting Court
premised its analysis on a close study of the particular capabilities and
functions of the cable medium. As new technologies blur the bounda-
ries between traditional media, this type of context-sensitive analysis
will be ever more important. Preserving high levels of protection for
core First Amendment speakers like newspapers will require careful
attention to new media that are performing traditional functions in
different forms. The continued evolution of media technologies, com-
bining hitherto distinct functions and relying, in many cases, on gov-
ernment-private partnerships, requires a new jurisprudence of
speakerhood.
VI
The Unseen Alternative: Public Television and the
Turner Broadcasting Remand
In the long term, the questions we raise in this Article relate to
future Congressional and agency decisions concerning new media
technologies. But in the short term, the treatment of Turner Broad-
casting on remand and the possible revisiting of the future decision of
the three-judge tribunal by the Supreme Court provides an opportu-
nity to think more creatively about public television and the must-
carry rules. We do not renounce our view about the appropriateness
of content-based regulation in this context; indeed, content considera-
tions should necessarily play a role in the remand court's determina-
tion.92  However, as citizen-advocates for a strengthened public
television system, we here embrace the law of the case: namely that
Section 5, like Section 4, is content-neutral. That holding-against
which we have heretofore argued-forecloses a debate, at the hearing
on remand, about whether Sections 4 and 5 should be subject to strict
92. The Turner Broadcasting Court phrased the O'Brien inquiry as addressing whether
"the economic health of local broadcasting is in genuine jeopardy." 114 S. Ct. at 2450.
Except in the most formal and artificial sense, it is impossible to speak about preserving
the health of broadcasting without invoking some substantive vision of what broadcasting
is or ought to be. Assurance of the existence of broadcast television necessarily implies
some assumptions about what functions that entity will perform and the type of program-
ming it will provide. Prime-time type programming, for example, is expensive to produce.
If that is the type of programming we expect from broadcasters, they must have a suffi-
ciently robust financial profile to bankroll such ventures. Perhaps the Court is saying that
Congress can try to ensure that a broadcast system exists at only a minimal level but that if
Congress seeks to assure some level of performance-more than old cartoons, or a time
and weather scroll-constitutional questions arise. But that interpretation of the health of
broadcasting, as mere economic viability, defeats the purpose of the legislation. If broad-
casting is only to be propped up on the threshold of economic oblivion, it cannot be ex-
pected to deliver programming of sufficient value to justify its existence.
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scrutiny.93 But careful analysis of the circumstances of noncommer-
cial broadcasting-a necessary aspect of the remand hearing-will
demonstrate the differences, in application, between Sections 5 and
Section 4. The three-judge court should pay close attention to these
differences and, in considering them, entertain the possibility that Sec-
tion 5 may be constitutional while Section 4 is not.
How could that be the case? How can the remand tribunal build
on a distinction between categories that was disregarded by the
Supreme Court? Despite holding that the must-carry rules were con-
tent-neutral, the Turner Broadcasting Court, applying the two-part
O'Brien test,94 concluded that it lacked sufficient evidence to rule on
the statute's constitutionality. The Court consequently remanded to
determine if "the economic health of local broadcasting is in genuine
jeopardy and in need of the protections afforded by must-carry," and
that the statute does not "burden substantially more speech than is
necessary to further the government's legitimate interests."95 As to
both these tests, there are important differences between the two
broadcasting systems. In performing the task delegated to the remand
court, the danger is that the two systems of broadcasting will be
lumped together and the analytic rigor so highly prized in the First
Amendment context will be lost. In undertaking the requisite analy-
sis, the three-judge tribunal should look separately at the two Sections
and two types of broadcasters in determining whether the relevant
class of broadcasters is in danger of extinction if the must-carry rule is
dissolved and whether the rule is sufficiently finely-tailored to with-
stand constitutional attack.
In order to establish the first prong of the analysis prescribed by
the Court, the government is obliged to demonstrate both that signifi-
cant numbers of local broadcasters would be dropped from cable sys-
tems absent mandatory carriage and that "the broadcast stations
93. One might argue that the Court's reasoning sometimes appears to rely for its find-
ing of content-neutrality on the fact that § 5 and § 4 were enacted together. See id. at 2462.
"The operation of the Act further undermines the suggestion that Congress' purpose in
enacting must-carry was to force programming of a 'local' or 'educational' content on cable
subscribers. The provisions, as we have stated, benefit all full power broadcasters irrespec-
tive of the nature of their programming." Id. However, the Court squarely stated, without
relying on this finding, that both sections were content-neutral and that the allusions to
content in the legislative history only show that "the services provided by broadcast televi-
sion have some intrinsic value." Id. at 2477. At least from the standpoint of proceedings in
the Turner Broadcasting case, the issue of § 5's content neutrality seems conclusively
determined.
94. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
95. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2470 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781 (1989)).
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denied carriage will either deteriorate to a substantial degree or fail
altogether." 96 While the Court grudgingly assumed for the sake of
argument that the government could have satisfied the burden of
showing that significant numbers of broadcasters would be dropped,97
there is substantial evidence that public broadcasters would be
dropped or repositioned much more frequently than their commercial
counterparts.98 Public broadcasters are also endemically in a marginal
financial position. Reductions in viewership, and hence in the pool of
contributors, will have a dramatic effect on the viability of stations
already teetering on the financial brink.99 Moreover, unlike commer-
cial broadcasters, a local noncommercial broadcaster denied carriage
has few options for switching to programming that may be more likely
to be voluntarily carried by a cable operator. A local commercial sta-
tion can always seek to affiliate itself with a network that is attractive
to a cable operator. The programming sources for educational televi-
sion, and hence the options for commercial broadcasters, are much
more limited.
As the remand court should recognize in its analysis of commer-
cial broadcasting as well, the economic health of local broadcasters is
often dependent on the economic health of broadcasting generally. 1°°
For public television, this interdependence exists with a vengeance.
Crippled from the outset by a system of inadequate national coverage
and the disadvantage of reliance on many weak UHF outlets, the ca-
-pacity of public broadcasting to develop an effective and efficient
means of scheduling and acquiring programming has always been
weak. Under current public broadcasting service rules, the local out-
let requires independently raised funds to acquire programming
through the PBS cooperative and its capacity to do so declines if its
audience is diminished. The inability of a group of noncommercial
outlets to bid for national programming would weaken the capacity of
96. Id. at 2471.
97. Id.
98. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
99. It could be argued that if public broadcasting only became generally viable
through mandated carriage, the baseline for measuring the harm from non-carriage should
be the condition of public broadcasting before cable carriage was mandated. But that is
not the question the Court asks. It merely asks about the effect on broadcasters if they are
denied mandated carriage. That must-carry may have facilitated the growth of noncom-
mercial broadcasters far more than commercial broadcasters is irrelevant to the Court's
remand analysis.
100. The economic health of local broadcasters cannot be decided on a station by sta-
tion basis. Because the capacity of the wholesaler (the network) to bid for programming
for the station (the local broadcaster) is dependent on the cumulative audience of stations,
a network like CBS is weakened when any of its major affiliates disappear, lose audience,
or are otherwise financially weakened. All CBS affiliates suffer if the network suffers.
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PBS to bid for high quality educational programming. Dwindling lo-
cal viewership could well translate not only into a drop in local contri-
butions but also into dwindling support from Congress.
But mere economic peril does not adequately convey the risk to
public broadcasting from termination of mandatory carriage. Prior to
the growth of cable, the public broadcasting system was extraordina-
rily weak. Most stations were broadcast on the anemic UHF fre-
quency and commanded paltry audiences. Cable carriage
dramatically expanded public broadcasters' penetration of households
and, therefore, their capacity to attract personal and corporate contri-
butions and government support. Casting public broadcasters back to
their UHF origins can therefore be expected to constrict their audi-
ences and funding sources significantly. Their unique history also
shows why alternative measures are likely to be less successful for
noncommercial than commercial broadcasters; even if it proved a via-
ble alternative to mandatory carriage in some instances, the A/B an-
tenna switch would not correct the poor signal quality of the UHF
band, and hence the structural obstacles to noncommercial broadcast-
ing in the days before cable.
Indeed, the "serious risk of financial difficulty" test is better
adapted to measuring the state of commercial than noncommercial
broadcasters. 101 It seems appropriate to evaluate the health of for-
profit commercial broadcasters in terms of their ability to continue to
turn a profit. That is not the mission of public broadcasters. Their
goal is simply to introduce quality educational programming to an
ever wider audience. A commercial station might thrive economically
despite a shrunken audience; but for noncommercial stations, eco-
nomic survival is pointless if their programming fails to find an audi-
ence. A substantial reduction in the size of the audience for
noncommercial broadcasting is the effective equivalent of bankruptcy
for a commercial station. A more appropriate measure of the health
of noncommercial broadcasters should take into account effects on
viewership, apart from any economic consequences. By that standard,
noncommercial broadcasters again seem uniquely vulnerable to injury
from cessation of mandated carriage.
The second O'Brien prong also appears to make a stronger case
for Section 5 than Section 4. The penultimate paragraph of the Turner
Broadcasting opinion calls for additional findings concerning the ef-
fects of must-carry "on the speech of cable operators and cable pro-
grammers.' 10 2 On remand, the court is to inquire into the
101. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2472.
102. Id.
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extent to which cable operators will, in fact, be forced to make
changes in their current or anticipated programming selections; the
degree to which cable programmers will be dropped from cable sys-
tems to make room for local broadcasters; and the extent to which
cable operators can satisfy their must-carry obligations by devoting
previously unused channel capacity to the carriage of local
broadcasters.10 3
Mandatory carriage of noncommercial broadcasters poses only a
limited burden on cable operators in any case: a cable system with
twelve channels or fewer need carry only one noncommercial broad-
caster, and a system with up to thirty-six channels is required to carry
no more than three. Cable operators are also not required to carry
substantially duplicative noncommercial stations in many cases.' 4 In
a provision with no counterpart in Section 4, Section 5 requires cable
operators to import noncommercial television signals where no local
noncommercial broadcasters exist. 10 5 This provision again evinces
narrow tailoring. In precisely those situations where no carriage now
exists through local broadcasting, cable systems are charged with car-
rying noncommercial broadcasters, thereby enhancing the viability of
the noncommercial broadcasting system and furthering the ends of
public broadcasting, by bringing educational programming to previ-
ously unserved audiences.
In the long run, we adhere to the view that cautious, content-
based regulation should sometimes prevail over reflexive application
of formalistic doctrines in the cable arena. The alternative, too often,
is regulatory nonsense. But at this phase of the Turner Broadcasting
litigation, with the content-based status of Section 5 already resolved,
however errantly, the case for carriage can still be made in the Court's
own O'Brien-derived terms. Regulatory nonsense may still be trans-
muted, this one time, to adjudicative serendipity.
103. Id.
104. See 47 U.S.C. § 535(b)(3), 535(e) (Supp. IV 1992).
105. This provision also is narrowly tailored, not requiring such importation for a sys-
tem with fewer than 12 stations if it would displace stations already carried. 47 U.S.C.
§ 535(b)(2)(B).
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